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EFFECT  OF  THE  PROPOSAL  OF  DIRECTIVE  ON  SMALL  AND 
MEDIUM  SIZED  ENTERPRISES  AND  THE  LEVEL  OF  EMPLOYMENT 
1.  New  administrative  requirements  for  the  enterprises  arising 
from  the  application  of  the  legislation: 
None 
2.  Advantages  for  the  enterprises: 
The  directive  is  one  of  the  pre-requisite  pieces  of  h armo-
nisation  involved  in  the  establishment  of  a  truly  unified 
internal  market  in  banking.  The  achievement  of  such  a  market 
should  bring  about  a  process  of  intensified  competition  and 
enhanced  innovation  which  will  increase  customer  choice  and 
reduce  the  cost  of  banking  services.  The  small  and  medium 
sized enterprises  will  accordingly  benefit  from  wider  choice, 
more  favourable  terms  and  financial  products  better  suited  to 
their  needs.  At  the  same  time,  the harmonisation  proposed will 
strengthen  the  financial  base  of  credit  institutions  and 
promote  the  stability  of  the  banking  system.  This  will  have 
beneficial effects for  overall  economic  performance. 
3.  Disadvantages for  the  enterprise  (additional costs): 
As  a  proposal  aims  to  raise  average  solvency  standards  in 
order  to  protect  the  financial  soundness  of  individual  credit 
institutions  and  the  overall stability of  the  European  banking 
system,  there  may,  in  the  short-term,  be  some  increase  in  the 
cost  of  certain  banking  services  in  some  Member  States.  Any  . 
such  increases  should  in  the  longer-term  be  more  than  offset 
by  the  effects  of  greater  competition  between  providers  of 
banking  services. 
4.  Effects  on  the  level  of  employment: 
The  envisaged  reduction  in  the  cost  of  financial  services,  and 
the  imp~ovement in  the  quality  of  those  services,  should  have 
favourable  implications  for  the  prof  i tabi li  ty  of  enterprises 
in  other sectors,  and  thus  on  employment  therein. - 2  -
5.  Has  there be  a  prior consultation with  social  pa~tners? 
Yes,  with  banking  associations. 
What  is  their opinion: 
Broadly  favourable:  they  support  the  establishment  of  common 
prudential standards  and  the  broad  similarity  of  the  proposal 
to  standards  being  developed  in  a  wider  international 
framework.  They  are  not  all  in  favour  of  all features  of  the 
proposal,  and  believe  that  the  supervisory  authorities  should 
not  have  the  intended discretion  to  require solvency  standards 
above  the  minimum  proposed.  The  supervisors,  on  the  other 
hand,  unanimously  support  such flexibility. 
6.  Might  there be  a  less stringent alternative approach? 
No.  The  proposed  directive  aims  to  establish  a  comprehensive 
system  of  measuring  solvency  requirements.  The  minimum  level 
of  solvency  set  is  necessary  to  ensure  adequate  prudential 
standards,  as  is  allowance  for  a  certain  discretion  for 
supervisory  authorities  to  set  stricter  standards  as  they 
judge  appropriate. 
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'  11' .  .. PROPOSAL  FOR  A  COUNCIL  DIRECTLVE  ON  A  SOLVENCY 
RATIO  FOR  CREDIT  INSTITUTIONS 
EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 
I.  PRELIMINARY  REMARKS 
Main  objectives  of  the  proposal 
1.  The  proposal  has  two  main  objectives.  The  first  is  to  achieve 
an  important  part  of  the  harmonisation  of  prudential  super-
vision  necessary  for  completion  of  the  internal  market  in 
banking.  The  second  is  to  strengthen  average  solvency 
standards  among  Community  credit institutions  in  order further 
to protect both  depositors  and  investors  and  the  stability  of 
the  banking  system. 
2.  As  part  of  the  necessary  harmonisation  to  be  achieved  before 
completion  of  the  internal  market,  the  proposed  directive 
accompanies  the  proposal for  a  Directive  on  the  definition  of 
own  funds  of  credit  institutions  (1)  and  the  Commission 
Recommendations  on  large  exposures  and  deposit  guarantee 
schemes  ( 2).  It  is  particularly  closely  associated  with  the 
first  mentioned  proposal  as  own  funds  form  the  numerator  of 
the proposed  solvency ratio. 
The  principles  of  the  ratio 
3.  The  proposed  ratio  expresses  the  own  funds  of  each  credit 
institution as  a  proportion  of  the  risk-adjusted  value  of  its 
assets  and  off -balance  sheet  business.  This  type  of  "risk-
weighting"  approach  was  developed  over  the  course  of  several 
years  in  work  carried  out  for  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee 
established by  the First Banking  Coordination  Directive  of 
(1)  OJ  No  C  243,  27.9.86,  p.  4 
(2)  OJ  No  L  33,  4.2.87,  pp.  10  and  16 - 2  -
1977  (1).  It is  now  widely  recognised  as  the  most  appropriate 
and  flexible  measure  of. solvency  as  it  distinguishes  between 
the  degrees  of  risk  associated  with  particular  assets  and 
off-balance sheet  items.  Simpler  ratios  making  no  distinction 
between  types  of  assets  and  off-balance  sheet  engagements  and 
the  associated  risks  embody  the  implicit  assumption  that 
capital  requirements  should  be  the  same  for  all  kinds  of 
transactions. 
4.  The  ratio  makes  full  allowance  for  the  risks  inherent  in 
off-balance  sheet business,  an  area  of  banks'  activities which 
has  grown  rapidly  in  the  recent  past.  From  a  prudential 
perspective it is  essential  to  allow  for  the  potential risk  of 
i terns  which  may  move  on  to  banks'  balance  sheets,  especially 
as  this  is  likely  to  happen  at  a  time  when  the  average quality 
of  their traditional  loan  books  is deteriorating. 
5.  The  ratio principally relates  to  the  credit  risks  involved  in 
the  event  of  counterparty  default.  However,  the  recitals  make 
reference  to  further  work  on  the  prudential  treatment  of 
interest rate  and  exchange  rate  risk,  and  other market  risks.  In  particular, 
the  Conmi ssion  has  begun  the necessary  1oo.0rk  required  in order to propose  in ci.Je  course  the 
necessary  provisions to establish a  framework  for  the control of  market  risks arising 
out  of open  positions taken on  by  credit  institutions in  respect  of  their operations 
on  securities markets. 
A  minimum  standard 
6.  The  proposal  establishes  common  definitions  and  techniques  for 
a  solvency  ratio.  Beyond  this  it establishes  a  minimum  level 
for  that  ratio,  to  be  respected  by  all  Community  credit 
institutions  from  1  January  1993  onwards.  The  proposal 
contains  a  provisional  minimum  ~ igure  of  8%  selected  after 
consideration  of  the  confidential  statistics.  collected  since 
1981  for  the  Advisory  Committee.  The  Commission  considers  it 
necessary  to  include  this  indicative figure  so  that  the  effect 
of  the  proposal  can  be  judged  as  a  whole.  It  is  intended  that 
the  figure  should  be  reviewed  following  a  statistical  survey 
of  credit institutions'  ratios based  on  the definitions  in  the 
proposal.  This  survey  has  been  prepared  by  the  Commission  and 
(1)  OJ  No  L  322,  17.12.1977,  p.  30 - 3  -
will  be  conducted  in  the  first  half  of  1988  by  the  Contact 
Group  of  EC  banking  supervisors.  The  Commission  will,  if 
'necessary,  in  the  light  of  the  results  of  that survey,  propose 
an  amendment  to  the  figure  before  the  Directive  is  finally 
adopted. 
7.  To  ensure  the  continuous  strengthening  of  capital  standards, 
the proposal stipulates  that  between  the  coming  into  force  of 
the  directive  on  1  January  1990  and  the  date  from  which  the 
minimum  ratio  must  be  respected,  1  January  1993,  no  credit 
institution  with  a  ratio  below  that  minimum  may  allow  it  to 
fall  except  temporarily  in  the  period  immediately  after  the 
issuing  new  capital. 
Equality  of  treatment  for  Community  borrowers;  treatment  of 
country  risk 
8;  For  the  purposes  of  assigning  risk  weights  to  various  assets 
and  off-balance  sheet  items,  borrowers  are grouped  in  a  number 
of  broad  categories:  central  banks,  central  governments, 
credit institutions,  and  so  on.  Beyond  this  distinction  drawn 
on  the  basis  of  the  type  of  borrower,  there  is  a  distinction 
between  "domestic",  meaning  EC,  borrowers  and  "foreign", 
meaning  all  other  borrowers.  In  the  case  of  most  inter-bank 
business,  reflecting  the  homogeneity  of  the  short-term  inter-
bank  market,  loans  to  "domestic"  and  "foreign"  banks  are  given 
the  same  weight.  This  is  also  true  of  loans  to,  and  off-
balance  sheet  i terns  incurred  on  behalf  of,  "domestic"  and 
"foreign"  non-banks.  But  in  the  case  of  other  types  of 
borrower,  central banks  and  central governments  and  so  on,  and 
in  the  case  of  long-term  inter-bank  business,  "domestic" 
borrowers  receive  lower  weights  than  their  "foreign"  counter-
parts.  The  distinction  goes  much  of  the  way  towards  making 
allowance  for  the  element  of  country  risk  in  banks'  lending, 
but  it  is  nonetheless  true  that  the  residual  "foreign" 
category  contains  a  mixture  of  (a  smaller  number  of)  highly - 4  -
creditworthy  countries  and  (a  larger  number  of)  those  with 
external financing  problems.  For  this  reason,  and  in  the  case 
of  inter-bank business  for  the  additional  reason  that  several 
non-EC  G-10  members  seem  likely  in  the  near  future  to  re-
inforce  the  solvency  of  their  banks  by  the  adoption  of 
standards  similar  to  those  contained  in  this proposal,  Article 
8  allows  for  the  possibility  of  extending  "domestic"  weights 
to  "foreign"  borrowers,  where  the  risks  are  considered 
equivalent. 
Adaptation  of  the  ratio:  Committee  procedure 
9.  It  is  important  that,  once  the  Directive  is  in  force,  it 
should  be  possible  to  adapt  the  ratio  as  quickly  as  possible 
to  changes  in banks'  business  and  in  the  nature  of  ri~ks  run. 
This  is particularly true  of  the  new  off-balance  sheet  trans-
actions  which  are  captured  by  the  ratio.  Accordingly,  a 
flexible  adaptation  procedure  is  proposed.  The  use  of 
Regulatory  Committee  version  (a)  is  preferred  in  view  of  the 
sensi ti  vi ty  of  the  banking  sector  and  the  central  role  of 
national  banking  supervisory  authorities  in  the  operation  of 
the  proposed  Directive. 
II.  COMMENT  ON  THE  ARTICLES 
Scope  (Articles  1  and  3(2)) 
1. 'Article  1  stipulates  that  the  proposal  applies  to  all  credit 
institutions  as  defined  in  the  first  indent  of  Article  1  of 
the  First  Coordination  Directive  allowing  for  certain 
exemptions  made  in  that  Directive  and  in  86/524  ( 1) .  This 
definition explicitly excludes  branches  of  third country banks 
located  in  Member  States  from  the  scope  of  the  proposal.  The 
question  of  who  is responsible for  the  supervision  of  the 
(1)  OJ  No  L  309,  4.11.86,  p.  15 n.,. 
I 
I. 
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solvency  of  these  branches will  continue  to  be  decided. by .the. 
competent  authorities  of  the  host  Member  States.  Prevailing 
standard  practice  is ·for  supervision  to  be  carried  out  by 
relevant  third country authorities where  supervisory standards 
are  recognised as  equivalent. 
2.  Article  3(2)  offers  further  precision  concerning  the 
institutional  basis  on  which  the  ratios  are  to  be  calculated 
and  respected.  The  first  requirement  is  that  consolidated 
ratios,  in  conformity with  Directives  83/350  (1)  and  86/635(2) 
must  be  calculated  and  respected.  In  addition,  unconsolidated 
ratios for  all  credit  institutions  are  prescribed.  Discretion 
is ·offered  to  national  supervisory  authorities  to  require 
sub-consolidated  rather  than  unconsolidated  ratios  for 
subsidiary credit instithtion-s. 
Definitions  (Article  2) 
3.  A  routine  list  of  definitions,  partly . drawn  from  earlier 
Directives  in  the  banking  field,  is  proposed  in  order  to 
simplify  and  standardise  the  text. 
General  principles  (Article  3) 
4.  This  article establishes  a  number  of  basic principles  relating 
to  the  proposal: 
- Article  3 ( 1)  provides  a  simple  description  of  the  proposed 
solvency  ratio.  This  is  subsequently  elaborated  in  Articles 
4-6  and  the  Annexes·,  but  Article  3 (1)  offers  the  only 
complete description of  method; 
- Article  3(2)  is discussed at II(2)  above; 
(1)  OJ  No  L  193,  13.6.83,  p.  18 
{2)  OJ  No  L  372,  8.12.86,  p.  1 - 6  -
- Article  3 ( 3)  stipulates  that  there  shall  be  formal 
verification  and  control  of  the  ratios  at  least  twice  a 
year; 
- Article  3 (4)  establishes  that  the  balance  and  off-balance 
sheet  i terns  ref  erred  to  in  the  proposal  shall  be  valued 
according  to  the  harmonised  standards  of  the  Annual  Accounts 
Directive. 
The  numerator  of  the  ratio  (Article  4) 
5.  The  proposed  numerator  is  own  funds  as  they  are  finally 
defined  in  the directive  on  the definition of  own  funds. 
The  denominator  of  the  ratio  (Articles  5  and  6  and  Annexes  1-4) 
6.  Article  5  provides  a  description  of  the  method  used  to  arrive 
at  risk-adjusted  values  for  balance  and  off -balance  sheet 
items.  Fuller descriptions  of  method  and  lists  of  instruments 
are  given  in  annex  form  in  the  case  of  off -balance  sheet 
items,  whose  treatment  in  the  ratio  is  more  complex  than  that 
of  balance sheet  items. 
7.  Article  6  lists the  asset  and  off-balance  sheet  items  falling 
under  each  risk  weight  ( 0%,  10%,  20%,  50%  and  100%) .  The 
proposed  treatment  of  interest  and  exchange  rate  related 
off-balance sheet  items  cannot be  presented  in  this  manner  and 
is instead covered  in  Annex  3. 
8.  Article  7  explains  the  risks  applicable  in  the  case  of  claims 
on,  and  off -balance  sheet  business  undertaken  on  behalf  of, 
local  authorities  and  regional  governments.  The  proposed 
system  is  one  of  mutual  recognition  of  the  weights  deemed 
appropriate  to  their  own  local  authorities  by  individual 
supervisory authorities. - 7  -
Implementation  powers  of  the  Commission;  modification  procedures 
(Article  8) 
9.  In  view  of  the  pace  of  change  and  innovation  in  the  banking 
sector  it is  proposed  that  most  of  the  technical  features  of 
the  directive  should  be  subject  to  modification,  as  appro-
priate,  on  the  initiative  of  the  Commission,  a£ ter  consult-
ation with  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee.  It is proposed  that 
the  latter  should  act  in  the  capacity  of  a  regulatory 
committee.  The  extension  of  "domestic"  weights  to  third 
countries,  referred  to  in  section  I  paragraph  8,  is  one  of  the 
; 
specific  features :which  it  is  proposed  may  be  undertaken  in 
accordance  with  th~ modificatiqn  procedures  of  the  Article. 
I 
Implementation  of  the directive  (Article 9) 
10.  Following  the  timetable  of  the  Second  Banking  Coordination 
Directive,  it  is  proposed  that  the  appropriate  compliance 
measures  should  be  adopted  by  1  January  1990. 
11.  Article 9  stipulates  that  a  minimum  solvency  ra tic  must  be 
continuously  respected  by  credit  institutions  after  1  January 
1993.  It provides  that,  in  the  e~nt of  ratios  falling  below 
the  minimum,  competent  authorities  must  ensure  that corrective 
action is  taken. 
12.  It  also  states  that  those  credit  institutions  whose  solvency 
ratios  are  below  the  stipulated  minimum  at  the  time  of  the 
coming  into  force  of  the  directive  must  not,  except  in  the 
particular case  of  an  issue  of  capital,  allow  their  ratios  to 
fall  between  that  date  and  the  end  of  1992.  The  intention  as 
explained  earlier  is  to  promote  the  continuous  strengthening 
of  capital  standards  before  the  minimum  level  established  in 
the  proposal  becomes  binding with  effect from  1  January  1993. - 8  -
13.  The  article  additionally  makes  it  clear  that  the  figure  in 
paragraph  3  is  a  minimum  and  that  national  supervisory 
authorities  may  require  higher  ratios  according  to  their 
judgment. PROPOSAL  FOR  A  COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE.  ON  A 
SOLVENCY  RATIO  FOR  CREDIT  INSTITUTIONS 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community,  and  in  particular  Article  57(2),  third  sentence 
thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the  proposal  from  the  Commission, 
In  cooperation with  the  European  Parliament, 
Having  regard  to  the  opinipn  of 
Committee, 
the  Economic  and  Social 
Whereas  the  Directive  is  a  dev~lopment from  the  work  undertaken 
by  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee  which _has,  under  Article  6(41 
of  Council  Directive  77/780/EEC  of  12  December  1977  on  the  co-
ordination  of  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions 
relating  to  the  taking  up  and  pursuit  of  the  business  of  credi  l 
institutions  (1),  as  amended  by  Directive  86/524/EEC  (2),  responsibility 
for  making  "suggestions  to the  Commission  with  a  view  to  coordinating· the 
coefficients  applicable  in  the  Member  States"; 
Whereas  appropriate  solvency  ratios  play  a  central  role  in  tne 
prudential supervision  of  credit  institutiuns; 
Whereas  ratios  which  weight  assets  and  off -balance  s!.-:et: t  1:i "''"': 
actions  according  to  the  degree  of  credit  risk  are  pi:ll ti.cL.Jcii i.:t 
useful  measures  of  solvency; 
Whereas  the  development  of  common  s Landards  uf  CdfH t.d j 
in  relation  to  assets  and  off -balance  sheet:  l.U:;oilb  d  1: 
accordingly,  one  of  the  essential  area.s 
_.  .; 
necessary for  the  achievement  of  mutual  recogn~ t  J.ufJ  ciJJri  l.n,~L'  ;_;·_._ 
completion  of  the  internal  market  in  banking  ser '•  )_ce~; 
(1)  OJ  No  L  322,  17.12.1977,  p.  30 
(2)  OJ  No  L  309,  4.11.1986,  p.  15. - 2  -
Whereas  in  this  respect  the  Directive  is . connected  with  other 
specific  legislation  also  harmonizing  the  fundamental  techniques 
JQ 
of  prudential supervision:  Council  Directive  I  /EEC  on  own  funds  (1), 
the  Commission  Recommendations  87/62/EEC  (2)  and  87/63/EEC  (3)  on  large  ex-
posures  and  deposit  protection  schemes; 
Whereas  the  Directive  should  also  be  seen  as  directly 
complementary  to  the  Second  Coordination Directive  which  lays 
out  the broader  framework  of  which  this  Directive  is  an  integral 
part; 
Whereas  the  minimum  ratio  contained  in  this  Directive  is 
provisional  in  nature;  whereas  it will  be  reviewed  fallowing  a 
statistical  survey;  whereas  the  Commission  will,  if  necessary, 
duly  propose  an  amendment  to  the figure  before  the final  adoption 
of  the  Directive; 
Whereas  measurement  of,  and  allowance  for,  interest  and  exchange 
rate  risk,  and  other  market  risks,  are  also  of  great  importance 
in  prudential  supervision;  whereas,  the  Commission  shall, 
accordingly,  in  cooperation  with  the  competent  authorities  of 
Member  States  and  others  working  toward  similar  ends,  further 
study  the  available  techniques;  whereas  it  shall  then  make 
appropriate proposals for  the further harmonisation  of  prudential 
rules  relating  to  these  risks; 
Whereas  technical modification  to  the detailed  rules  contained  in 
this  Directive  may  from  time  to  time  be  necessary  to  respond  to 
new  developments  in  the ·banking  sector;  whereas  the  Commission 
shall accordingly  make  such  modifications  as  are  necessary,  after 
consulting  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee,  within  the  limits  of 
the  implementing  powers  delegated  to  the  Commission  by  the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty;  whereas  that  Committee  shall  act  as  a 
"Regulatory"  Committee,  according  to  the  rules  of  procedure  laid 
down  in  Article  2,  procedure  III  variant  a)  of  Council  Decision 
87/373/EEC  of  13  July  1987  laying  down  procedures  for  the 
exercise  of  implementing  powers  confered  to  the  Commission(4). 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECTIVE: 
(1)  OJ  No  L 
( 2)  OJ  No  L  33,  4.2.87,  p.  10 
( 3)  OJ  No  L 33,  4.2.1987,  p.  16 
( 4)  OJ  No  L  197,  18.7.1987,  p.  33 - 3  -
Scope  and  definitions 
Article  1 
1.  This  Directive shall apply  to  cr~dit institutions within  the 
meaning  of  the  first  indent  of  Article  1  of  Directive 
77/780/EEC. 
2.  Notwithstanding  indent  1  above,  the  Member  States  need  not 
apply  this  Directive  to  credit  institutions  listed  in 
Article  2 ( 2)  of  Directive  77  I 780/EEC. 
3.  Credit institutions which,  as  defined  in  Article  2(4)(a)  of 
Directive  77/780/EEC are affiliated to  a  central body  in  the 
•arne  Member  State,  may  be  exempted  from  the  provisions  of 
this  Directive,  provided  that  the  totality  of  those 
affiliated  credit  institutions  and  the  central  body  are 
included  in  consolidated  solvency  ratios  in  accordance  with 
this Directive. - 4  -
Article  2 
For  the purposes  of  this Directive  : 
- "competent  authorities"  shall be  defined  in accordance  with  the fifth 
indent  of  Article  1  of  Council  Directive  83/350/EEC  of  13  June 
1983  on  the  supervision  of  credit  institutions  on  a  con-
solidated basis  (1); 
''domestic  credit  institutions"  shall  comprise  all  credit 
institutions  authorized  in  the  Member  States, 
in  ~ccordance with  Article 3  of  Directive 
77/780/EEC,  and  branches  of  those  institutions  established 
outside  the  EC; 
"foreign credit  institutions"  in  this  Directive  shall  comprise 
all private  and  public  undertakings  licensed outside the  Member 
States  which  satisfy  the  definition  in  the  first  indent  of 
Article  1  of  Directive  77/780/EEC,  and  their branches; 
- in  the  case  of  central  governments  and  central  banks,  regional 
governments  and  local  authorities,  and  the  non-bank  sector  as 
de£ ined  below,  "domestic"  shall  mean  of  the  Member  States ; 
11foreign
11  shall  mean  of  other  countries; 
- "non-bank sector"  shall be  defined  as  all  borrowers other  than credit 
institutions as  defined  in  the  second  and  third  indents  above, 
central governments  and  central banks,  regional  governments  and 
local  authorities,  the  European  Communi ties  and  the  European 
Investment  Bank  ( EIB) ,  and  the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements  ( BIS) ,  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
and  Development  ( IBRD) ,  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
( IMF) ; 
(1)  OJ  No  L  193,  18.7.83,  p.  18 
{~ - 5  -
-
11f ull  risk 
11 
1  "medium  risk"  1  "medium/ low  risk"  and  "low  risk" 
off-balance sheet  items  are described  in  Annex  1  and  listed  in 
Annex  2; 
- "participation 
11  shall be defined  in accordance 
of  Article 1  of  Directive 83/350/EEC. 
with  the  third  indent - 6  -
Article  3 
General  principles 
1.  For  the  purposes  of  measuring  the  solvency  of  credit 
institutions  as  defined  in  Article  1,  the  competent  autho-
rities  of  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  ratios  are 
calculated for  each  credit institution which  express  its own 
funds,  as  defined  in Article  4,  as  a  proportion  of  its total 
risk  adjusted assets  and  off-balance sheet items,  as  defined 
in Article  5. 
2.  Ratios  shall  be  calculated  on  a  consolidated  basis  in 
accordance  with  Directive  8 3/350  /EEC  and  Council  Directive 
86/635/EEC  of  8  December  1986  on  the  annual  accounts  and 
consolidated  accounts  of  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions  (1).  Notwithstanding  the  above  requirement,  un-
consolidated ratios shall  also  be  calculated  for  all  credit 
institutions.  However,  the  competent  authorities  shall  have 
the  discretion  to  require  subconsolidated  rather  than  un-
consolidated ratios for  credit institution subsidiaries. 
3.  Without  prejudice  to  the  compliance  obligations  of  credit 
institutions established  in  Articles  9 ( 2) ,  ( 3)  and  ( 4) ,  the 
competent  authorities  shall  ensure  that  the  ratios  are 
controlled  not  less  than  twice  each  year. 
4.  Valuation  of  assets  and  off -balance  sheet  i terns  shall  be 
undertaken  in  accordance with  Directive  86/635/EEC. 
(1)  OJ  No  L  372,  31.12.86,  p.  1 
ll( ; 
\~. 
- 7  -
Article  4 
Own  funds:  the  numerator 
Own  funds,  as  defined  in  Directive  ••.  I . ..  /EEC !._of 
•..  / ...  /19 .•  on  the  own  funds  of  credit  institution.~._TP 
form  the  numerator  of  the  solvency ratio. 
shall - 8  -
Article  5 
Risk-adjusted  assets  and  off-balance  sheet  transactions:  the 
denominator 
1.  Degrees  of  credit  risk,  expressed  as  percentage  weights, 
shall  be  assigned  to  the  asset  items  in  accordan~ with  the 
provisions  of  Article  6.  The  balance  sheet  value  of  each 
asset  shall  then  be  multiplied  by  the  relevant  weight  to 
arrive at  a  risk-adjusted value. 
2.  In  the  case  of  the  off  -balance  sheet  items  included  in 
categories  (a)  to  (e)  of  Article 6,  a  two-s~age calculation, 
in accordance with  rules  presented  in  Annex  1,  shall be  used 
to  arrive  at  risk  weights.  Risk-adjusted  values  shall  be 
obtained by multiplying  the  value  of  each  off-balance  sheet 
item  by  the  relevant  risk weight. 
3.  In  the  case  of  the  interest  rate  and  foreign  exchange  rate 
related  off-balance  sheet  items  in  Article  6{2),  the 
potential· costs  of  replacing  cash  flows  in  the  event  of 
counterparty default shall be  assessed by  the application  of 
either of  the  two  methods  presented  in  Annex  3.  These  costs 
shall be multiplied  by  the  relevant  counterparty  weights  in 
Article  6(1)  to give  risk-adjust~d  ~alues. 
4.  The  total  of  the  risk-adjusted  values  of  assets  and  off-
balance  sheet  items described  above  shall be  the  denominator 
of  the  solvency ratio. 
16 9 
Article  6 
Risk  weights 
1.  The  following  weights  shall  be  applied  to  the  asset  and 
off-balance sheet  items  shown  below,  although  the  competent 
authorities  may  establish higher weights  as  they  see fit  : 
(a)  Nil  weight 
cash  in  hand  and  equivalent  items; 
asset  items  representing  claims  on  "domestic"  central 
governments  and  central banks; 
asset  items  representing  claims  carrying  the  explicit 
guarantee  of  "domestic"  central governments  and  central 
banks; 
asset  items  representing  claims  on  the  European 
Communities  and  the  EIB; 
asset  items  carrying  the  explic~t  guarantee  of  the 
European  Communities  and  the  EIB~ 
asset  i terns  representing  claims  on  the  BIS,  IBRD  and 
IMF; 
asset  items  carrying  the explicit guarantee  of  the  BIS, 
IBRD  and  IMF; 
all  off-balance  sheet  items  incurred  on  behalf  of 
"domestic"  central governments  and  central banks; 
all  off-balance  sheet  items  carrying  the  explicit 
guarantee  of  "domestic"  central governments  and  central 
banks; 
all  off  -balance  sheet  items  incurred  on  behalf  of  the 
European  Communities  and  the  EIB; 
all  off-balance  sheet  items  carrying  the  explicit 
guarantee  of  the  European  Communities  and  the  EIB; 
all  off -balance  s.heet  items  incurred  on  behalf  of  the 
BIS,  IBRD  and  IMF; 
all  off-balance  sheet  items  carrying  the  explicit 
guarantee  of  the  BIS,  IBRD  and  IMF; - 10  -
loans  and  off-balance sheet  items,  fully  and  completely 
secured  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  relevant  competent 
authorities,  by  any  of  the  asset  items  shown  above  and 
by  deposits  and  certificates  of  deposit  with  the 
lending  institutions; 
all off-balance sheet  items  having  low  risk,  regardless 
of  counterparty. 
(b)  10%  weight 
off-balance  sheet  items,  having  medium  risk,  incurred 
on  behalf  of  "domestic"  credit institutions; 
off -balance  sheet  i terns,  having  medium  risk 
the  explicit  guarantee  of  "domes tic" 
institutions; 
carrying 
credit 
off -balance  sheet  i terns,  having  medium  risk  and  an 
original  maturity  of  up  to  and  including  one  year, 
incurred  on  behalf  of  "foreign credit institutions; 
off-balance  sheet  items,  having  medium  risk  and  an 
original  maturity  of  up  to  and  including  one  year, 
carrying  the  explicit  guarantee  of  "foreign"  credit 
institutions. 
(c)  20%  weight 
asset  i terns  representing  claims  on  "domestic"  credit 
institutions; 
asset  items  representing  claims,  with  an  original 
maturity  of  up  to  and  including  one  year,  on  "foreign" 
credit institutions; 
asset  items  carrying  the  explicit  guarantee  of 
"domestic"  credit institutions; 
asset  items  representing  claims,  with  an  original 
maturity  of  up  to  and  including  one  year,  carrying  the 
explicit guarantee  of  "foreign"  credit institutions; 
off-balance sheet  items,  having  full  risk,  incurred  on 
behalf  of  "domestic"  credit institutions; 
off-balance sheet  items,  having full  risk,  carrying  the 
explicit guarantee  of  "domestic"  credit institutions; 
-1~ - 11  ...., 
' 
bff-bal~nce  sheet  items,  having  ftill  risk  ~nd  an 
original  maturity  of  up  to  and  including  one  year, 
incurred  on  behalf  of  "foreign"  credit institutions: 
off-balance  sheet  items,  having  full  risk  and  an 
original  maturity  of  up  to  and  including· one  year, 
carrying  the  explicit  guarantee  of  "foreign"  credit 
institutions: 
loans  and full  and  medium  risk  off-balance sheet items, 
fully  and  completely secured  to  the satisfaction of  the 
relevant  competent  authorities,  by  any  of  the  asset 
items  shown  above  in  the  20  % weight  category; 
off-balance sheet  items  having  medium/low  risk  incurred 
on  behalf  of  the  "domestic"  and  "foreign"  non-bank 
sectors; 
asset  items  ~epresenting  local  currency  claims  of 
"foreign  II  branches  of domestiC  Credit  institutions  on 
"foreign"  central governments,  funded  by  local  currency 
deposits; 
cash  items  in  process  of  collect~on,  where  the  corres-
ponding.prior  payments  have  already'been made. 
(d)  SO%  weight 
off  -balance  sheet  i terns,  having  medium  risk, 
on  behalf  of  "foreign"  central  and  regional 
ments,  local  authorities  and  central  banks 
I 
"domestic"  and  "foreign"  non-bank  sectors: 
incurred 
govern-
and  the 
off-balance  sheet  items,  having  medium  risk  and  an 
original  maturity  of  more  than  one  year,  incurred  on 
behalf  of  "foreign"  credit institutions; 
off-balance  sheet  items,  having  medium  risk  and  an 
original  maturity  of  more  than  one  year,  carrying  the 
explicit guarantee  of  "foreign"  credit institutions; 
loans  to  individuals  for  the  purchase  of  residential 
property  in  the  Community  for  :their  own 
occupation,  fully  and  completely  secured  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  relevant  competent  authorities,  by 
mortgages  on  the property in question. - 12  -
(e)  100%  weight 
asset  i terns  representing  claims  on  "foreign"  central 
and  regional  governments,  local authorities  and  central 
banks; 
asset  items  representing  claims,  with  an  original 
maturity  of  more  than  one  year,  on  "foreign"  credit 
institutions; 
asset  items  representing  claims  on ·the  "domestic"  and 
"foreign" non-bank  sectors; 
off-balance sheet  items,  having  full  risk,  incurred  on 
behalf  of  "foreign"  central  and  regional  governments, 
local authorities  and  central  banks  and  the  "domestic" 
and  "foreign"  non-bank  sectors; 
off -balance  sheet  i terns,  having  full · risk  and  an 
original  maturity  of  mote  than  one  year,  incurred  on 
behalf  of  "foreign"  credit institutions; 
tangible assets  in  accordance  with  assets  heading  C.II 
of  Article  9  of  Council Directive  78/660/EEC  of  25  July 
1978  on  the  annual  accounts  of  certain  types  of 
companies  (1); 
participations where  not deducted  from  own  funds; 
all other  asset~ except  where  deducted  from  own  funds. 
2.  The  methods  laid out  in  Annex  3  shall be  applied  to  interest 
rate  and  foreign  exchange  rate  related  off -balance  sheet 
instruments. 
(1)  OJ  No  L  222,  14.8.1978,  p.  11 
. --.. - 13  -
Article  7 
1.  Member  States shall fix  weights  of  either  0%, 
the  case  of  asset  i terns  representing  claims 
regional  governments  and  local  authorities, 
off -balance  sheet  i terns  incurred  on  behalf 
regional  governments  and  local  authorities. 
off -balance  sheet  i terns  incurred  on  behalf 
20%  or  50%  in 
on  their  own 
and  full  risk 
of  their  own 
Medium  risk 
of  their  own 
2. 
regional  governments  and  local  authorities  shall  corres-
pondingly  be  weighted  at  0%,  10%  or  20%.  Loans  and  off-
balance  sheet  i terns  carrying  the  explicit  guarantee  of  a 
regional · or  local  authority  shall  have  the  same  weight  as 
loans  to,  or  off-balance  sheet  items  incurred  on  behalf  of, 
the  same  regional  government  or  local  authority. 
·  Member  States  shall  notify  the  Commission  of  their 
weights,  the  Commission  shall  disseminate  that  information 
and  Member  States  shall  mutually  respect  the  weights  chosen 
by  each  other.  They  shall  have  the  discretion  to  apply 
weights  of  either  0%,  20%  or  50%  in  the  case  of  those 
foreign  countries  determined  in  accordatice  with  ~rticle  8(2~ 
with  medium  risk  off-balance  sheet  items, 
weighted  co~respondingly at  0%,  10%  or  20%. - -./.  ; 
- 14  -
Article  8 
1.  Technical  modifications  in  the  areas  of  this  Directive  shown 
below  may  be  made  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  set  out 
in  paragraph  3: 
- the  minimum  ratio established  in Article  9; 
- the weights  and  asset  items  in Article 6; 
the list and  classification of  off-balance sheet  items  in 
Annexes  2  and  4  and  their  treatment  in  the  calculation of 
the  ratio as  described  in  Article  5  and  Annexes  1  and  3. 
2.  The  Commission  may  also,  according  to  the  procedure  set  out 
in  paragraph  3~  extend  to foreign  countries  the  same  weights 
applied  to  domestic  centraL  governments, central  banks  and  credit 
institutions,  where  the  risks  are  considered  equivalent, 
notably  in  the  case  of  credit  institutions,  because  of 
arrangements  made  in  an  international  context  and  similarly 
to  extend  the  SO%  weight  for  mortgage-backed  loans  for  the 
purchase  of  property  in foreign  countries. 
3.  The  Commission  shall be  assisted  by  a  Committee  composed  of 
representatives  from  the  Member  States  and  chaired  by  a 
representative of  the  Commission. 
The  representative  of  the  Commission  shall  submit  to  the 
Committee  a  plan  of  measures  to  take.  The  Committee  shall 
give its opinion  on  the  plan within  a  time  limit  to  be  fixed 
by  the  Chairman  in  accordance  with  the  urgency  of  the 
matter.  The  opinion  shall  be  given  on  a  qualified  majority 
basis  according  to  Article 148(2)  of  the  Treaty  in  the  case 
of  decisions  which  the  Council  is  called  upon  to  take 
following  a  proposal  of  the  Commission.  In  the  Committee  the 
votes  of  the  representatives  shall  be  weighted  according  to 
the  above-mentioned  article.  The  Chairman  shall  not  vote. - 15  -
The  Commission  shall  implement  the  envisaged  measures  when 
they  are in  conformity with  the  opinion  of  the  Committee. 
When  the  envisaged  measures  do  not  conform  with  the  opinion 
of  the  Committee, or  in  the  absence  of  an  opinion,  the 
Commission  shall  without  delay  submit  to  the  Council  a 
proposal relating  to  the  measures  to  take.  The  Council  shall 
act  according  to qualified majority voting. 
If at  the  end  of  the  period which  will be  set in  the  case  of 
each decision to be  taken  by  the Council  as  a  result of  this 
paragraph~  a  period which  must  not  exceed  three  months  from 
the  day  on  which  the  Council  was  informed,  the  Council .has 
not  acted,  the  Commission  shall  implement  the  proposed 
measures. - 16  -
Article  9 
1.  Member  States  shall  adopt  the  measures  necessary  to  comply 
with  the provisions  of  this Directive by  1  January  1990. 
2.  Until  31  December  1992,  credit institutions whose  ratios 
are  below  8%*  shall  not  allow  their  ratios  to  fall  unless 
such  falls  are  associated with  the  issue  of  new  capital  and 
occur  in  the  period  immediately following  such  issuance.  The 
competent  authorities  shall  ensure  that  corrective  measures 
are  taken  if  falls  occur  for  any  reason  other  than  that 
referred  to  above. 
3.  With  effect  from  1  January  1993,  credit  institutions  shall 
not  allow  their  ratios,  as  defined  in  Articles  3 ( 1)  and 
3(2),  to  fall  below  8  %*.  In  the  event  of  such  an 
occurrence,  the  competent  authorities  shall  ensure  that 
appropriate  measures  to  restore  the  ratio  to  the  agreed 
minimum  are  taken  as  quickly  as  possible  by  the  credit 
institution in question. 
4.  Notwithstanding  paragraph  3,  the  competent  autho-
rities  may  establish  ratios  above  8%*  as  they  consider 
appropriate. 
5.  Member  States shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  the  texts 
of  the  main  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions 
which  they adopt  in  the field  covered  by  this Directive. 
*  This  figure  is  provisional.  A  definitive  figure  will  be  pro-
posed  after study  of  the  results  of  a  statistical  exercise  to  be 
undertaken  in  the first half  of  1988. - 17  -
Article  10 
This  Directive is addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  For  the  Council ANNEX  1  The  treatment  of  off-balance sheet  items 
in  the  solvency  ratio 
The  items  shall  first  be  grouped  according  to  the  perceived 
credit  risk  attaching  to  the  instrument  in  question  (see  Annex 
2).  "Full  risk"  off -balance  sheet  i terns  shall  be  deemed  to  carry 
a  credit  risk  equal  to  balance  sheet  items,  and  thus  their  full 
value  taken  into account;  "medium  risk"  items  shall be  considered 
to  carry  less  risk  and  only  one-half  of  their  value  taken  into 
account;  medium/ low  risk  i terns  shall  be  deemed  to  carry  lower 
risk  than  the  medium  category  and  one-fifth  of  their  value  taken 
into  account;  "low  risk"  i terns  shall  be  considered  to  carry 
negligible  risk  and  their  value  accordingly  set  at  zero.  The 
second  stage  shall  be  to  multiply  the  off-balance  sheet  values, 
adjusted  as  described  above,  by  the  weights  attributable  to  the 
relevant  ·  counterparties,  in  accordance  with  the  treatment 
afforded  to  asset  items.  In  the  case  of  asset sale and  repurchase 
agreements  and  outright  forward  purchases,  the  weights  shall  be 
those attaching  to  the  assets  in question  and  not  to  the  counter-
parties  to  the  transactions.  Article  6  combines  the  two-stage 
process  used for  off-balance sheet  items  into  a  single percentage 
weight. 
Where  off -balance  sheet  i terns  carry  explicit  guarantees,  they 
shall  be  weigh ted  as  if  they  were  incurred  on  behalf  of  the 
guarantor rather  than  the  counterparty.  Where  potential  exposure 
arising  from  off-balance  sheet  business  is  fully  and  completely 
secured,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  relevant  competent 
authorities,  by  any  assets  having  a  0%  or  20%  weight,  the  weight 
applicable  to  the collateral  and  net  to  the  counterparty shall be 
used. ANNEX  2:  classification of  off-balance sheet  items 
Full risk 
-Guarantees having  the character of  credit substitutes; 
- Acceptances; 
- Endorsements  on  bills  not  carrying  the  name  of  other  credit 
ins ti  tu  tions ; 
- Transactions witp  recourse; 
- Irrevocable  standby  letters  of  credit  having  the  character  of 
credit substitutes; 
- Asset  sale  and  repurchase  agreements  as  defined  in  Articles 
12(1)  and  (2)  of  Directive  86/635/EEC,  if  these  agreements  are 
treated  as  off-balance sheet  items  pending full  compliance  with 
Directive  86/635/EEC; 
-Assets purchased  under  outright forward  purchase  agreements; 
- The  unpaid portion  of  partly-paid shares  and  securities; 
- Other  items  also carrying full risk. 
Medium  risk 
- Documentary  credits  issued  and  confirmed  (see  als.o  medium/low 
risk); 
-Warranties  and  indemnities  (including  tender,  performance, 
customs  and  tax  bonds)  and  guarantees  not  having  the  character 
of  credit substitutes; 
- Asset  sale  and  repurchase  agreements  as  defined  in  Articles 
12(3)  and  (5)  of  Directive  86/635/EEC; 
- Irrevocable standby  letters  of  credit  not  having  the  character 
of  credit substitutes; 
- Undrawn  credit  facilities  (agreements  to  lend  purchase 
securities,  provide  guarantees,  acceptance  facilities)  with  an 
original maturity  of  more  than  one  year; 
Other  items  also carrying  medium  risk. - 2  -
Medium/low  risk 
- Documentary  credits  in  which  underlying  shipment  acts  as 
collateral and  other self-liquidating transactions. 
- Other  items  also carrying medium/low  risk. 
Low  risk 
- Undrawn  credit  facilities  (agreements  to  lend,  purchase 
securities,  provide  guarantees,  acceptance  facilities)  with  an 
original maturity  of  up  to  and  including  one  year. 
- Other  items  also  carrying  low  risk. ANNEX  3:  The  treatment  of  interest rate  and  foreign 
exchange  rate related off-balance sheet  items 
Subject  to  the  consent  ·of  their  supervisory  authorities,  credit 
institutions  shall  choose  one  of  the  methods  presented  below  to 
measure  the  risks  associated  with  the  transactions  listed  in 
Annex  4.  Interest  and  exchange  rate  contracts  traded  on 
recognised  exchanges,  and  exchange  rate  contracts  with  an 
original maturity  of  7  days  or  less shall be  excluded. 
Method  1:  the  "ma.rking  to  market"  approach 
Step  (a) :  on  the  basis  of  attaching  current  market  values  to 
contracts  (marking  to  market)  the  current  replacement  cost  of  all 
contracts with  a  positive value shall be  obtained. 
Step  (b):  to  obtain  a  figure for  potential future  credit exposure 
the  notional  principal  amounts  or  values  underlying  the  insti-
tutions'  aggregate  books  shall  be  multiplied  by  the  following 
percentages  (l): 
residual maturity 
less  than  one  year 
one  year  and  over 
interest rate 
contracts 
nil 
0.5% 
exchange  rate 
contracts 
1% 
5% 
Step  (c):  the  sum  of  current  replacement  cost  and  potential 
future  credit  exposure  shall  be  multiplied  by  the  risk  weight 
attached  to  the  relevant counterparties  in  Article  6. 
(1)  These  percentages  are provisional  and  subject  to  revision. - 2  -
Method  2:  the  "original  exposure"  approach 
Step  (a):  the  notional principal  amounts  of  each  instrument shall 
be multiplied by  the  percentages  given  below  (1): 
original maturity  interest rate  exchange  rate 
contracts  contracts 
less  than  one  year  0.5%  2% 
one  year  and  less  than 
2  years  1%  6% 
additional  allowance for 
each  subsequent  year  1%  4% 
Step  (b) :  the  original  exposures  thus  obtained  shall  be 
multiplied by  the  counterparty weights  given  in Article  6. 
(1)  These  percentages  are provisional  and  subject  to  revision. ~\ 
' 
ANNEX  4:  Types  of  interest and  foreign  exchange  rate 
related off-balance sheet  items 
Interest rate contracts 
- Single-curre~cy interest rate  swaps 
Basis  swaps 
- Forward  rate  agreements 
- Interest rate futures 
- Interest rate options  purchased 
- Other contracts  of  similar nature 
Exchange  rate  contract~ 
- Cross-currency  interest rate  swaps 
- Forward foreign  exchange  contracts 
- Currency futures 
- Currency  options  purchased 
- Other  contracts  of  similar nature 
A-123-XV/69ER87 EFFECT  OF  THE  PROPOSAL  OF  DIRECTIVE  ON  SMALL  AND 
MEDIUM  SIZED  ENTERPRISES  AND  THE  LEVEL  OF  EMPLOYMENT 
1.  New  administrative  requirements  for  the  enterprb;;es  arising 
from  the  application  of  the  legislation: 
None 
2.  Advantages  for  the enterprises: 
The  directive  is  one  of  the  pre-requisite  pieces  of  harmo-
nisation  involved  in  the  establishment  of  a  truly  unified 
internal  market  in  banking.  The  achievement  of  such  a  market 
should  bring  about  a  process  of  in  tens if  ied  competition  and 
enhanced  innovation  which  will  increase  customer  choice  and 
reduce  the  cost  of  banking  services.  The  small  and  medium 
sized  enterprises  will  accordingly  benefit  from  wider  choice, 
more  favourable  terms  and  financial  products  better  suited  to 
their  needs.  At  the  same  time,  the harmonisation  proposed will 
strengthen  the  financial  base  of  credit  institutions  and 
promote  the  stability  of  the  banking  system.  This  will  have 
beneficial effects for  overall  economic  performance. 
3.  Disadvantages  for  the  enterprise  (additional costs): 
As  a  proposal  aims  to  raise  average  solvency  standards  in 
order  to protect  the  financial  soundness  of  individual  credit 
institutions and  the overall stability of  the  European  banking 
system,  there  may,  in  the  short-term,  be  some  increase  in  the 
cost  of  certain  banking  services  in  some  Member  States.  Any 
such  increases  should  in  the  longer-term  be  off set  by  the 
effects  of  greater  competition  between  providers  of  banking 
services. 
4.  Effects  on  the  level of  employment: 
The  envisaged  reduction  in  the  cost  of  financial  services,  and 
the  improvement  in  the  quality  of  those  services,  should  have 
favourable  implications  for  the  profitability  of  enterprises 
in  other sectors,  and  thus  on  employment  therein. - 2  -
5.  Will  there be  prior consultations with  social partners? 
Yes 
Opinion  of  social partners: 
Favourable 
6.  Might  there  be  a  less stringent alternative approach? 
No.  The  proposed  directive  aims  to  establish  a  comprehensive 
system  of  measuring  solvency  requirements.  The  minimum  level 
of  solvency  set  is  necessary  to  ensure  adequate  prudential 
standards. 